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WHEN WEST MEETS EAST: THINKING 
BIG IN SINGAPORE OVER GOOD FAITH 
IN COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW 
YONG QIANG  HAN 
ABSTRACT. Singapore commercial contract law has taken an Asian 
perspective in respect of express terms of good faith in the negotiation 
of contract. In general, however, it adheres to the English contract law 
orthodoxy regarding good faith.  More specifically, Singapore, like 
England, does not recognize a general duty or principle of good faith 
and it is reluctant to imply a duty of good faith into a contract. 
However, as a hub of international trade and a rising forum for 
commercial dispute resolution, Singapore will have a stronger need to 
reconcile the differences in good faith in contract law between the 
English/Commonwealth and the European-Asian legal traditions. 
Conventional wisdom and international commercial law instruments 
in this respect are not as helpful as one would expect for such a need. 
Instead, to an enlightening but limited extent, the “organizing 
principle” approach in Bhasin v Hrynew could be useful for setting 
up a framework for reconciling the differences. This framework could 
consist of an organising principle of (honouring) reasonable 
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expectations, a duty of honesty, and a duty of fair dealing. The 
framework realistically concretises good faith into the three 
components, all of which are essentially objective and ascertainable in 
specific factual matrix and are well-recognised in both common law 
and civil law. 
 
KEYWORDS: Good faith; commercial contract; common law; civil law; 
reasonable expectations; honesty; fair dealing. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Small as it is, Singapore is part of the revived discussion 
of good faith in Commonwealth contract law in the wake of 
Bhasin v Hrynew.1 This is not only because Singapore, as a hub 
of commerce, is seated where West meets East and therefore its 
contract law is particularly relevant to international trade, but 
also because recent Singapore contract law has undergone 
noteworthy judicial adjustments in the Supreme Court of 
Singapore (specifically its upper division, i.e. the Court of 
Appeal) in respect of good faith in commercial contracts.  
This article aims to suggest an optional framework within 
which Singapore can “think big” over good faith in commercial 
contract so as to contribute to reconciling the apparent 
differences between West and East in this aspect of contract law. 
While this might be ambitious or even bold, the ambition is 
legitimate in principle at least.  If eventually fulfilled it could 
help to “oil the wheels of [international] commerce”2 and to 
 
 1 [2014] SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494. 
 2 Sir Robert Goff, “Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court [1984] 
LMCLQ 382, 391. 
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enhance Singapore’s rising status “as a leading forum for legal 
services and commercial dispute resolution.”3   
For that purpose, Part II of the article briefly shows how 
the Singapore Court of Appeal (“SGCA”) adhered to the 
English orthodoxy in one case and took an Asian perspective in 
another in respect of good faith in commercial contract. Part III 
examines the difficulties in reconciling the differences between 
common and civilian contract law in this respect through choice 
of the law under either legal tradition or by recourse to 
international commercial law instruments. The hardly 
surmountable difficulties render it necessary for contract 
lawyers to depart from conventional wisdom, as the Justices did 
in Bhasin v Hrynew. In this spirit, Part IV argues that Singapore 
courts might as well think big over the judicial approaches to 
good faith. Such efforts could be made possible by learning 
partly from Bhasin v Hrynew, and specifically by concretising 
the idea of good faith within a framework consisting of 
enquiries concerning honesty, fair dealing, and on an 
organising principle of honouring the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the parties. This concretising framework is more 
likely to effectively reconcile the differences between common 
law of contract (which generally resists imposition of good faith 
duties) and civilian contract law (which is generally very 
receptive to the principle of good faith). Such reconciliation can 
pave the way for even better Singaporean resolution of 
international commercial disputes which concern the issue of 
good faith. 
 
 3 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (Singapore 
Ministry of Law, Nov 2013) [4(a)]. A small common law jurisdiction as Singapore is, 
the potential need to think big sometimes over thorny legal issues is not to be limited 
by the constraint of its size but rather is enhanced by its geographical advantage. 
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II. GOOD FAITH IN SINGAPORE COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW 
A requirement of good faith can be established through 
express contract language by the contractual parties. However, 
an express term of good faith in a contract is not always free 
from dispute. This is so in the recent SGCA case HSBC 
Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development 
Singapore Pte Ltd.4 More often, the requirement of good faith can 
be set, if at all, by way of judicial implication of a term/duty (of 
good faith) into the contract in question. This is so in the SGCA 
case Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd 5 in which the 
issue of good faith was “raised squarely for the first time”. 6  
Only occasionally is a requirement of good faith imposed by 
statute. For example, in Singapore it has been a statutory 
requirement that an application for collective sale of parcel by 
majority of subsidiary proprietors shall not be approved if the 
transaction is not in good faith. 7 
A. Implied Term/Duty of Good Faith: The SGCA’s Adherence to 
the English Orthodoxy 
In Ng Giap Hon, an issue considered by the SGCA was 
whether or not a term based on the doctrine of good faith could 
be implied into an agency agreement between the appellant 
remisier (a type of broker agent) and a stockbroking company, 
a first respondent. It was alleged that a director of the company 
intercepted the account-opening forms allegedly sent by the 
appellant to two of his customers.  But for the interception, the 
 
 4 [2012] SGCA 48. 
 5 [2009] SGCA 19. 
 6 Ibid [1]. 
 7 Land Titles (Strata) Act, s 84A(9)(a)(i). See also s 84D(7)(a)(i), s 84E(9)(a)(i), 
and s 84FA(9)(a)(i). 
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customers would have opened their accounts with the 
appellant rather than the company. The appellant claimed 
remuneration from the company for the lost commission. His 
arguments were that in the agency agreement there was a duty 
of good faith implied in law, and that there was a term, implied 
in fact, that the company would not do anything to deprive him 
from earning his commission. 
In considering the appellant’s arguments above, Andrew 
Phang JA firstly combed the Singaporean law of implied terms, 
which is consistent with English law. He stressed that courts 
must be cautious to imply a term in law because that would 
involve broader policy considerations and would create a 
precedent of doing so in the future for all contracts of the same 
type. 8 In particular in this case, to imply the term in law 
“involves a concept [of good faith] which is itself 
controversial”.9 Andrew Phang JA rightly found the 
controversies in his survey of the judicial and academic 
discussions of good faith in English, Australian, American, and 
Canadian contract laws.10  Considering the extensive 
controversies over good faith in commonwealth contract law, 
he declined to imply in law a duty of good faith into contracts 
in the Singaporean context, because “[u]ntil the theoretical 
foundations as well as the structure of this doctrine [of good 
faith] are settled, it would be inadvisable (to say the least) to 
even attempt to apply it in the practical sphere”. 11   
 
 8 Ng Giap Hon (n 5) [46] (emphasis in the original) 
 9 Ibid [46] (emphasis in the original) 
 10 Ibid [47-59]. 
 11 Ibid [60]. 
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While good faith cannot be implied in law in Singapore, 
can it be implied in fact? For the same reason, this is only 
possible—but highly unlikely. Andrew Phang JA opined: 
[A]lthough it is possible to incorporate the doctrine of good 
faith into a contract under this narrower category of implied 
terms [in fact], this would not … be a very persuasive 
argument, having regard to the state of flux that the doctrine 
of good faith continues to be in [.]12 
This is consistent with his response to the appellant’s 
argument for an implied-in-fact term of non-deprivation in the 
agency agreement. Assuming that non-deprivation could be 
part of fair dealing and hence good faith, one can see that the 
SGCA effectively refused to imply in fact a specific duty of good 
faith into the contract. For an analysis based on terms implied 
in fact, Andrew Phang JA opined that “whilst the concept of 
good faith (or, more likely, the elements thereof) might be 
present, the focus of the court would … be on the particular 
factual matrix before it.” 13 The orthodox necessity test or the 
“business efficacy” and “officious bystander” tests for 
determining a “term implied in fact” were applicable in this 
case. The SGCA found that the particular factual matrix in this 
case could not give rise to circumstances that would make it 
necessary to imply in fact the term based on the two tests. 
The Ng Giap Hon decision is consistent with the English 
orthodox rules for implied terms. In hindsight, one might ask: 
What would the decision have been had the case arisen soon 
after the fresh developments in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International 
 
 12 Ibid [61]. 
 13 Ibid [61] (emphasis in the original). 
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Trade Corporation Ltd 14 and Bhasin v Hrynew? 15 It might still be 
the same as Ng Giap Hon.  In 2015, the SGCA, by Andrew Phang 
JA again, noted in obiter that “a close analysis of the judgment 
[of Yam Seng] itself…suggests that the English position is not 
that much different from the existing Singapore position in Ng 
Giap Hon”.16 Also in obiter, the SGCA has noted that whether or 
not the Bhasin v Hrynew formulation of good faith “is too vague 
and general. . .ought best to be decided in a definitive fashion 
only when they next come directly for decision before the 
courts.”17  
“Where an express term (which does not lack any 
ambiguity) exists, that would of course be the ideal solution.”18  
Ideal as that might be, it does not warrant immunity from 
dispute. This was so in the second and more recent SGCA case 
on good faith. 
B.  Express Term/Duty of Good Faith: The Singaporean Approach 
The second SGCA case on good faith in commercial 
contract is HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v 
Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd.19 In this case, for the 
purpose of rent review exercises under a commercial lease 
agreement, there was a clause providing that parties “shall in 
good faith endeavour to agree on the prevailing market rental 
 
 14 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
 15 Bhasin (n 1). 
 16 The One Suites Pte Ltd v Pacific Motor Credit (Pte) Ltd [2015] SGCA 21 [44] 
(Andrew Phang JA). 
 17 Ibid. 
 18 Ng Giap Hon (n 5) [99] (emphasis added). 
 19 [2012] SGCA 48. 
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value of the demised premises”. A central issue in this case was 
whether this express term of good faith was valid.  
Since the dispute concerned negotiation, Walford v Miles20 
is of course relevant in principle. The SGCA has rightly 
distinguished the two cases. In short, the Walford-type situation 
concerns negotiation for a contract which is yet to be concluded, 
whereas scenarios like this SGCA case involve negotiation 
during an existing contract which is already binding on the 
parties. Consequently, in this SGCA case, “the Parties are not 
free to simply walk away from the negotiating table for no 
rhyme or reason. By virtue of entering into the Lease 
Agreement, the Parties have committed themselves to a rent 
review exercise”.21 In contrast, “in a Walford-type situation, the 
parties have much greater latitude as there is no [existing] 
overarching contractual framework binding them.” 22  
Considering the foregoing distinction, the SGCA has 
held that Walford v Miles “does not have the effect of 
invalidating an express term in a contract which employs the 
language of good faith.” 23 Noting that “it is fairly common 
practice for Asian businesses to include similar clauses in their 
commercial contracts”, 24 the SGCA upheld the express “good 
faith clause” for the reason, inter alia, that such clauses are “not 
contrary to public policy … [but instead] are in the public 
interest as they promote the consensual disposition of any 
potential disputes.” 25 The SGCA has found that such clauses 
“are consistent with our [Asian] cultural value of promoting 
 
 20 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL). 
 21 HSBC (n 19) [37].  
 22 Ibid.  
 23 Ibid [37].  
 24 Ibid [40]. 
 25 Ibid.  
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consensus whenever possible. Clearly, it is in the wider public 
interest in Singapore as well to promote such an approach towards 
resolving differences.”26  
The SGCA’s Asian-Singaporean perspective draws upon 
Philip McConnaughay’s observation of the Asian commercial 
contracting practices and culture, which are different from that 
in the West:  
A core term of many Asian commercial contracts—the 
“friendly negotiations” or “confer in good faith” clause—
captures the essence of contractual obligation in the Asian 
tradition. Such clauses typically recite that, if differences or 
disputes arise during the course of the contractual 
relationship, the parties will discuss and resolve the matter 
amicably. The Western view of such clauses is that they 
impose no real obligation at all; at most, they represent a 
mechanism for making unenforceable requests for novation, 
or perhaps an initial formality in a multiple-step dispute 
resolution process culminating eventually in compulsory 
adjudication intended to enforce precise contractual terms. 
But these views presuppose a Western understanding of the 
contract itself, which is not shared in Asia. From a traditional 
Asian perspective, a “confer in good faith” or “friendly negotiation” 
clause represents an executory contractual promise no less 
substantive in content than a price, payment, or delivery term. It 
embodies and expresses the traditional Asian supposition that the 
written contract is tentative rather than final, unfolding rather than 
static, a source of guidance rather than determinative, and 
subordinate to other values – such as preserving the relationship, 
avoiding disputes, and reciprocating accommodations – that may 
control far more than the written contract itself how a commercial 
relationship adjusts to future contingencies. Characterizing a 
“confer in good faith” or “friendly negotiation” clause as a 
 
 26 Ibid (emphasis in the original). 
Yong Han Printers Final (Do Not Delete) 10/2/2019  8:47 PM 
326 JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH LAW [Vol. 1 
“dispute resolution” clause tempts a misapprehension of this 
essential nature, for no “dispute” exists if all of the parties to 
the contract share an Asian understanding of its evolving and 
responsive (through good faith conferences and friendly 
negotiations) nature.27 
The Asian perspective could indeed be helpful where 
there is an express term of good faith in a contract between 
Asian parties, as is in this SGCA case. However, where there is 
only one Asian party, which is more often the case in 
Singapore’s own international trade,28 or there is even no Asian-
party at all, the SGCA’s Asian-Singaporean perspective is 
unlikely to be readily appreciated by a Western or non-Asian 
party. This is not unlikely in the Singaporean hub of 
international trade—and in the rising Singaporean forum for 
the resolution of international commercial disputes which 
might not involve a Singaporean or Asian party at all.  
  
 
 27 Philip McConnaughay, “Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-
West Commercial Relationships” (2000–2001) 41 Virginia J Int’l L 427, 448–449 
(emphasis by the SGCA in italics and bold italics); cited by the SGCA in HSBC (n 19) 
[40]. 
 28 The visualising data from Singapore’s Department of Statistics shows that 
for 2017 among Singapore’s 10 major trading partners it has much larger trade value 
with trading parties from civil law jurisdictions (mainland China, EU but including 
Ireland and the UK, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, amounting to 
482.7 billion Singapore dollars) than from common law jurisdictions (Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, and the US, amounting to 257.7 billion Singapore dollars). See 
<https://www.singstat.gov.sg/modules/infographics/singapore-international-trade> 
accessed 10 Aug 2018. This of course is not the full picture, but it can be safely 
assumed that Singapore’s trading value with Commonwealth jurisdictions is smaller 
than that with beyond. This means that a Singaporean party’s international trading 
counter-party is frequently not from a common law jurisdiction. 
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III. RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES BEYOND EAST AND WEST: 
MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 
The differences in respect of good faith in contract law 
transcend the conceptual West versus East demarcation. They 
are apparently between West and East, but essentially between 
English(-Singaporean) common law of contract and European(-
Asian) civilian contract law in this respect. Contract law in most 
Eastern or Asian jurisdictions mostly follows from their 
reception of the European continental civilian contract law. In 
sharp contrast to common law jurisdictions, Eastern/Asian 
systems recognise an overarching principle of good faith. The 
following fundamental differences are hardly reconcilable by 
choice of contract law of either legal tradition. This bare 
irreconcilability necessitates recourse to international contract 
law instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) and the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG).  However, neither of these is as helpful as one 
would expect for reconciling the difference in good faith in 
contract law between the two legal traditions. 
A.  Pre-contractual or Post-Contractual 
Consistent with English contract law, there is no pre-
contractual duty to negotiate in good faith in Singapore, where 
Walford v Miles29 remains good law.30 In contrast, in Asian 
civilian contract law, the duty of good faith permeates the full 
life of a contract, and as a corollary it extends to the pre-
contractual stage. The ubiquitous binding force of the duty 
 
 29 Walford (n 20). 
 30 HSBC (n 19) [36]. 
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often follows directly from a mandatory statutory provision of 
the general requirement/principle of good faith, often in a civil 
code or by a statutory enactment. This is so, for example, at least 
with mainland China, 31 Japan,32 Korea,33 the Taiwan region,34 
Thailand,35 and Vietnam.36 This is common in civil law 
jurisdictions including but not limited to those in Europe and 
South America. Post-contractual good faith does exist in 
common law, but its existence is very limited, as can be seen 
below. 
1.  Post-Contractual Good Faith: Express, Implied, or Statutory 
Where there is an express contract term of post-
contractual good faith, Asian civilian contract law usually 
recognises the term as valid, whether it is general or specific, so 
long as the contract per se is valid too. English-Singaporean 
contract law can recognise an express term of post-contract 
good faith as valid provided that it is not a general term. This is 
more so in Singapore in the wake of HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd 37 
as discussed above. By contract, English contract law recognises 
an express good faith term on narrower grounds. As was stated 
in Mid Essex NHS Trust v Compass Group, “care must be taken 
not to construe a general and potentially open-ended obligation 
 
 31 Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law 2016, section 7, describing “good 
faith” as “adhering to honesty and committed to promises”; Chinese Contract Act 
1999, s 6; Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law 1986 (repealed), s 4. 
 32 Japanese Civil Code 1896, s 1(2). 
 33 Civil Code of the Republic of Korea 1958, s 2(1). 
 34 Civil Code of Republic of China 1929, s 148. 
 35 Thailand Civil and Commercial Code 1933, s 5. 
 36 Vietnam Civil Code 1992, s 6. 
 37 HSBC (n 19) 48. 
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such as an obligation to “co-operate” or “to act in good faith” as 
covering the same ground as other more specific provisions, lest 
it cut across…them.”38 This reinforces English contract law’s 
persistent reluctance to recognise a general principle or general 
duty of good faith in commercial contracts. The scope of the 
binding force of an express clause of good faith “must be 
assessed in the light of the provisions of that clause, the other 
provisions of the contract, and its overall context.” 39 
Where there is no express requirement of good faith, the 
difference is no less sharp. Under civilian contract law, a 
statutory, overarching, default and non-excludable 
requirement of good faith is binding to the contractual parties. 
The requirement applies to the whole process of a contractual 
transaction. In sharp contrast, “English law has, to its 
advantage, developed a nuanced conception of good faith in 
performance [of contracts] by using its chosen mechanism of 
implied terms.”40 This approach has been followed in 
Singapore.41 Due to the inherent limitation of implying terms 
under common law, there is only very limited space for courts 
to imply a term of good faith in commercial contracts. This is 
because “in order not to undermine the concept of freedom of 
contract itself, terms would be implied [in fact] only rarely—in 
exceptional cases where [the orthodox ‘business efficacy’ test or 
the ‘officious bystander’ test could be satisfied].” 42  
 
 38 Mid Essex NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 
200 [154] (per Beatson LJ). 
 39 Ibid [151]. 
 40 H Collins, “Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing” (2014) 67 CLP 297, 330. 
 41 Ng Giap Hon (n 5). 
 42 Forefront Medical Technology (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak Pte Ltd [2006] SGHC 3, 
[29], [31] (per Andrew Phang J, referring to the English cases The Moorcock (1889) 14 
PD 64 and Shirlaw v Southern Foundries Limited [1939] 2 KB 206.) 
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There are practical consequences to such an approach, 
the most important of which is that the implication of a term or 
terms in a particular contract creates no precedent for future 
cases. In other words, the court is only concerned about arriving 
at a just and fair result via implication of the term or terms in 
question in that case – and that case alone. 43 
In contrast, to imply a term in law is “the search, based 
on wider considerations, for a term which the law will imply as 
a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual 
relationship.”44 A “term implied in law” is “grounded (in the 
final analysis) on reasons of public policy”,45 a recourse to 
which is an exception in commercial contract law. “Under this 
category of implied terms, once a term has been implied, such 
a term will be implied in all future contracts of that particular 
type.”46 Hence “courts ought to be as—if not more—careful in 
implying terms on this basis, compared to the implication of 
terms [in fact].” 47  
Therefore, both approaches to implying a term, 
particularly of good faith, into a commercial contract are quite 
constrained. The English case Yam Seng 48 reportedly presaged 
an implied requirement of good faith in long-term or relational 
contracts as a category of contracts which may necessitate 
 
 43 Ibid [41] (per Andrew Phang J). 
 44 Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294 (HL), 307 
(per Lord Bridge).  
 45 Jet Holding Ltd v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SGCA 20 [90] 
(per Andrew Phang JA). 
 46 Forefront (n 42) [42]. 
 47 Ibid [44]. 
 48 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
Yong Han Printers Final (Do Not Delete) 10/2/2019  8:47 PM 
2019] GOOD FAITH IN SINGAPORE CONTRACT LAW 331 
implied terms of good faith. Nevertheless, that was a dicta,49 
and instead Yam Seng was a case of implying a term (of good 
faith) in fact rather than in law. Hence unsurprisingly it creates 
no precedent for future cases. Yam Seng is not of determinative 
or precedential value for implying in law or in fact a term of 
good faith. 
That is so despite considerable strength has been given 
to Yam Seng in the very recent English High Court judgment 
delivered on 15 March 2019 in Bates v Post Office Ltd,50 which in 
itself merits some reconsiderations. This new case 
(re)discovered—and expressly reiterated—the judicial 
recognition, over 2013-2018 mostly in the High Court and 
occasionally in the Court of Appeal, of the existence of 
relational contract. 51 In this case, Mr Justice Fraser has declared 
that “there is a specie of contracts, which are most usefully 
termed “relational contracts”, in which there is implied an 
obligation of good faith”. 52 In finding so, however, the learned 
Judge did not address in substance the prior judicial statement, 
made only less than  three years ago and also in the High Court, 
that “the mere fact that a contract is a long-term or relational 
one is not, of itself, sufficient to justify such an implication [an 
obligation of good faith].”53  
 
 49 Ilkerler Otomotiv v Perkins Engines Co Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 183 [28]. See also 
Bates v Post Office Ltd [2019] EWHC 606 (QB) [708]. 
 50 Bates v Post Office Ltd [2019] EWHC 606 (QB). 
 51 Ibid [705]. As referred to therein, Jackson LJ stated in Amey Birmingham 
Highways Ltd v Birmingham City Council [2018] EWCA Civ 264 at [92]: “The contract 
before the court is a PFI [i.e., Private Finance Initiative] contract intended to run for 
25 years. It may therefore be classified as a relational contract. In recent years there 
has been much academic literature on relational contracts and on the question 
whether they are subject to special rules.” 
 52 Bates (n 50) [711]. 
 53 Monde Petroleum SA v Westernzagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm) [250].  
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Moreover, Mr Justice Fraser states that to find a contract 
to be relational, “[t]here must be no specific express terms in the 
contract that prevents a duty of good faith being implied into 
the contract”, 54 and that this is a “determinative” 55 
characteristic of a relational contract. Nevertheless, it seems that 
here the cart draws the horse. Whether or not a contract is 
relational should not depend on whether it has express terms of 
good faith. If it has, certainly it is unnecessary to imply a 
requirement of good faith, and the contract is more likely to be 
relational. If it does not have such express requirement, then it 
might be necessary to imply good faith into the contract. This 
returns to the established test of necessity, rather than readily 
creating a new specie of contract for which a term can be 
implied due, at least apparently, to the contract specie or type 
per se. The latter approach is underpinned by public policy 
considerations which underlie implication of terms in law.56 
However, for commercial contracts or in commercial context, 
public policy considerations hardly have a place under the 
common law tradition. This is because public policy, like “a 
very unruly horse”,57 often leads to uncertainty, which is the last 
the commercial world would find ease with. 
Therefore, given the limited receptiveness of Yam Seng 
and the arguable reflection on Bates v Post Office Ltd, 58 it is 
perhaps still premature—as it was when the Yam Seng 
 
 54 Bates (n 50) [725], in which Mr Justice Fraser has listed nine non-exhaustive 
“characteristics [which] are relevant as to whether a contract is a relational one or 
not” and which are non-determinative except the first one. 
 55 Ibid [726]. 
 56 Jet Holding Ltd (n 45) [90]. 
 57 Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, 252; 130 ER 294, 303 (per Burroughs 
J). 
 58 (n 50). 
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judgment was made in February 2013—to indisputably find 
any category of commercial contract, even apparently of 
relational characteristics, which would automatically warrant 
judicial implication of a term in law or in fact, let alone a term 
of good faith.59 
That being said, an implied-in-fact requirement of good 
faith is mainly recognised for the exercise of contractual 
discretion in the performance of contract.60 In this regard, it is 
now more well-settled that “in the absence of very clear 
language to the contrary, a contractual discretion must be 
exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously.” 61  
Under English-Singaporean contract law, there is no 
implied duty of good faith in exercising a right to terminate a 
contract, regardless of whether the right of termination rests in 
the contract or in common law. An implied term of good faith 
would not and could not circumscribe or restrict what the 
parties had expressly agreed in a clause of termination.62 A 
contractual right to terminate a contract may be exercised 
irrespective of the exercising party’s reasons or justifications for 
 
 59 An exception to this is the entrenched and enshrined principle of (utmost) 
good faith for (business) insurance contract. However, in English insurance law, the 
requirement of (utmost) good faith arises not from an implied term in insurance 
contracts, but from the operation of common law codified into the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 s 17 which stipulates that “Insurance contract is based upon utmost good 
faith”.  
 60 Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co Ltd v Product Star Shipping Ltd (“The Product 
Star”) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397 (CA); Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd 
[2001] EWCA 1047; Nash v Paragon Finance Plc [2001] EWCA 1466; British 
Telecommunications plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd [2014] UKSC 42. 
 61 British Telecommunications Plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd [2014] UKSC 42 [37] 
(per Lord Sutton); See also Greenclose Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2014] 
EWHC 1156 (Ch) [150] (per Andrew J). 
 62 TSG Building Services plc v. South Anglia Housing Ltd [2013] EWHC 1151 
(TCC). 
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doing so, as long as the contractual conditions (if any) for the 
exercise of such a right have been satisfied.63 Where a party has 
a common law right to terminate the contract for repudiatory 
breach, the innocent party’s right to elect to accept the breach 
and terminate the contract, or to affirm the contract and keep 
the parties’ respective rights and obligations alive, is clearly a 
legal discretion concerning potential termination. It is not a 
matter of contractual discretion for which a requirement of 
good faith can be implied in fact. As a corollary, a contractual 
party’s decision concerning its common law right to terminate 
a contract is not in itself subject to the requirement of good faith 
either. 64 
2.  IrreconcilabilityRecourse to the PICC and the CISG? 
The non-existence of the requirement of pre-contractual 
good faith and the fairly limited scope of post-contractual good 
faith in English-Singaporean contract law contrasts sharply 
with the ubiquitous, overarching scope of the requirement of 
good faith under civilian contract law. This renders the 
differences between the two legal traditions in this respect 
barely reconcilable by choice of legal rules under either legal 
tradition. While civilian contract lawyers might hardly find it 
challenging to accept that the requirement does operate in some 
scenarios in common law, they will meanwhile be concerned 
 
 63 Monde Petroleum (n 53). 
 64 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA 
Civ 789, [45] (Moor-Bick LJ did “not think it is necessary or desirable to resort to [a 
requirement of good faith] in order to decide the outcome of the present case” and of 
this issue. In his view, “the better course is for the law to develop along established 
lines … There is […] a real danger that if a general principle of good faith were 
established it would be invoked as often to undermine as to support the terms in 
which the parties have reached agreement.) 
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that such scenarios are very limited and uncertain. Likewise, it 
is most challenging for their common law counterparts to 
accept the ubiquity of the requirement of good faith in civilian 
contract law. This means that, for contracts between parties of 
the two legal traditions, the law of good faith under either legal 
tradition cannot effectively solve this problem of 
irreconcilability. 
 In response to the problem above, a natural and possible 
solution would be to have a neutral or eclectic legal instrument 
for international trade as the model (choice of) law. This 
naturally brings us to the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (PICC) and the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG). However, neither can be truly helpful for the 
reconciliatory purpose. 
The current PICC (2016), like its predecessor versions, in 
Article 1.7 provides for the general principle that “(1) Each 
party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade [and] (2) The parties may not exclude or 
limit this duty.” Essentially this is the same as—almost in 
verbatim with—Article 1:201 of the Principles of European 
Contract Law (PECL). Such a civilian-style broad general duty 
of good faith makes it clearly unfit for our reconciliatory 
purpose where one of the contractual parties is from common 
law tradition. That being said, the PICC is useful for 
reconciliation only to the extent that its specific provisions 
“which constitute a direct or indirect application of the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing”65 can be adopted ex ante 
by the parties as the model contract clauses rather than be chosen 
either ex ante or ex post as the applicable contract law.  
 
 65 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016 (UNIDROIT 
2016) 18.  
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The very limited usefulness of the PICC necessitates  
recourse to the CISG, which Singapore and other major 
economies in Asia as well as in Europe have ratified into their 
respective national law. In contrast to the PICC 2016, the CISG’s 
position on good faith could perhaps be truly helpful in 
reconciling the differences in this respect. As discussed below, 
this is (somewhat surprisingly) because the CISG’s express 
reference in Article 7 to “good faith” is not binding to 
contractual parties—at least not directly thereto. Nor can a 
general principle of good faith be inferred from the Article 7 
case law. The CISG Article 7(1) provides:  
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to 
its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith 
in international trade.66 
In this provision, “the bearers of this duty [of good faith] 
can only be courts and arbitrators”.67 This is because the 
requirement of good faith is applicable not to the interpretation 
of contracts by courts and tribunals, but to the interpretation of 
the CISG. Therefore, “the need to promote … the observance of 
good faith” in the CISG Article 7(1) is not even a principle for 
interpreting the contract in question, and certainly not a 
substantive principle which imposes upon the contractual 
parties an obligation of good faith as the PICC Article 1.7 does.  
At most, purely by logic and assumption, “the 
observance of good faith” might refer implicitly to observance 
by contractual parties. This is seemingly unquestionable; 
 
 66 CISG Article 7(1). 
 67 Michael Bridge, “Good faith, Common Law and the CISG” (2017) 22 Unif L 
Rev 98, 108, and also particularly its fn 53. 
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nevertheless the legislative history of the CISG Article 7(1) does 
not support such an assumption. The CISG Article 7(1) is the 
result of the compromise between common law and civil law in 
its legislative history.68 The compromise was perceived as 
“actually burying the principle of good faith [in its civil law 
tradition]”69 by the CISG. Therefore, unlike civilian contract 
law, the CISG Article 7(1) imposes no duty of good faith directly 
upon contracting parties. 
Legal cases which were understood to have invoked the 
CISG Article 7(1) reference to good faith might be more dubious 
than they otherwise appear. Indeed, “there is little to remark on 
the judicial treatment of good faith in Article 7(1).”70 As regards 
Article 7 cases in Asia, one that has been cited in influential 
sources as vindicating a CISG requirement of good faith for 
contractual parties is the Chinese case Comac SpA Ltd v Shanghai 
Swift Mechanical & Electronic Equipment Co Ltd, 71 decided by the 
Shanghai People’s High Court, the highest appellate court in 
Shanghai. Although this is not the place to mine the case for 
details, here it suffices to point out that both the trial and the 
appellate courts’ references to “the observance of good faith in 
 
 68 Ibid 113. 
 69 Alejandro M. Garro, “Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” (1989) 23 International 
Lawyers 443, Part II.B.4 “Good Faith”. Available online at the Pace University CISG 
Database: <https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/garro1.html> last updated 20 
March 2008, last accessed 12 July 2018. 
 70 Bridge (n 67) 112. See also ibid 114: “Looking for a substantial manifestation 
of good faith in the case law of the CISG is like fishing in the wrong part of the Sea 
of Galilee.” 
 71 Pace University CISG database: 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/110921c1.html> last updated 14 January 2014, 
accessed 12 July 2018. See also Ewan McKendrick and Qiao Liu, “Good Faith in 
Contract Performance in Chinese and Common Laws” in Larry A DiMatteo, Chen 
Lei (eds), Chinese Contract Law (CUP 2018) 73, particularly fn 5 in that chapter. 
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international trade” in the CISG Article 7(1) were out of context. 
Both courts gave weight only to the wording “the observance 
of good faith”, taking it for granted that it was a requirement 
for contractual parties. However, they failed to appreciate that 
Article 7(1) stressed, for interpreters of the CISG, “the need to 
promote … the observance of good faith” in parallel to “the need 
to promote uniformity in its application”, and they also failed 
to appreciate the afore-mentioned compromise72 in the 
legislative history of the CISG Article 7(1). This case also 
exemplifies the judicial potential to find, by returning to Article 
7(1) via Article 7(2),73 a general principle of good faith. “The 
question is whether this formula [in Article 7(2)] opens the door 
to those who see good faith as an existing, universal norm.” 74 
Case law on Article 7(2) shows that unresolved matters cannot 
be settled by invoking good faith: 
The problem with a concept that explains everything is that it 
explains nothing. Good faith can explain why contracts 
should be performed (pacta sunt servanda), but it can equally 
justify why they should not be performed (for example, 
hardship).75  
Whilst the CISG Article 7(1) does not incline toward a 
broad general civilian-style duty of good faith, it could still be 
practically problematic for contractual parties of common law 
 
 72 Bridge (n 67). 
 73 CISG Article 7(2): “Questions concerning matters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with 
the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international 
law.” 
 74 Bridge, (n 67) 113. 
 75 Ibid 114. 
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background. This is not least because the CISG applies only to 
international sale of goods, but more importantly due to the 
following reasons. First, the interpretive principle of good faith 
in the CISG Article 7(1) is for interpreting the CISG, not for 
interpreting contracts. Second, even if the interpretive principle 
of good faith were applicable to contracts, it does not fit the 
established English-Singaporean approach to interpretation of 
contracts, an approach which is supposed to follow only those 
principles classically summarized in Investors Compensation 
Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,76 which however 
do not include or recognize a priori an interpretative principle 
of good faith.  
As the effort to seek reconciliation through international 
instruments such as the PICC and the CISG proves futile, it is 
necessary to consider departing somewhat from the 
conventional approaches to good faith in commercial contracts. 
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in Bhasin v Hrynew77 has 
so departed at least more in form that in substance. For our 
reconciliatory purpose, we might as well also consider making 
a departure which is similar but not identical. Such 
considerations require thinking big over the judicial approach 
to good faith in commercial contracts. 
 
 
IV. THINKING BIG IN SINGAPORE OVER THE REQUIREMENT OF 
GOOD FAITH 
The SGCA has noted Bhasin v Hrynew in obiter, but 
clearly with much cautiousness, albeit being open to consider it 
 
 76 [1998] 1 All ER 98 (HL). 
 77 (n 1). 
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in a definite fashion at the next possible judicial opportunity.78 
Before a judicial opportunity would arise again in Singapore, 
academic discussions shall proceed well ahead of it. This is 
particularly so when it is arguably necessary for the Singapore 
judiciary to think big over good faith in commercial contracts. 
It is necessary because, as has been argued above, the 
conventional wisdom in terms of the current common law of 
good faith in commercial contracts and of the international 
commercial contract law optional instruments is actually not 
really useful for reconciling the differences in this regard 
between contractual parties respectively of the English common 
law tradition and of European-Asian civil law tradition. Given 
that, one needs to think beyond the conventional wisdom and 
instead think big. Clearly to a large extent, this has emerged in 
the SCC decision in Bhasin v Hrynew. 
What is arguably “revolutionary”79 in Bhasin v Hrynew is 
that the SCC “cut the Gordion knot in a novel manner: by 
grounding the solution in an “organising principle of good 
faith,”80 rather than in the conventional wisdom of implying 
terms of good faith into contract. Instead the SCC found “an 
organising principle of good faith” and a specific duty of 
honesty thereunder. Whether the SCC’s both findings are 
desirable has been widely debated in common law jurisdictions; 
however, its methodological departure from conventional 
wisdom is particularly worthy of judicial attention.  Perhaps 
when, and if, a judicial opportunity for considering good faith 
in contract arises in Singapore, judges could also try to depart 
 
 78 One Suites (n 16) [44]. 
 79 Chris DL Hunt, “Good Faith Performance in Canadian Contract Law” 
(2015) 74 CLJ 4, 6. 
 80 Zhong Xing Tan, “Keeping Faith with Good Faith? The Evolving Trajectory 
Post-Yam Seng and Bhasin” [2016] JBL 420, 424. 
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from the conventional technique of implied term and instead 
make concrete enquiries about good faith. After all, “[i]n 
practice, we must…concretize the idea of a good faith regime, 
then the rules so determined should govern”.81  
A.  Concretising the Idea of Good Faith: Reasonable Expectations, 
Honesty, and Fair Dealing 
Two sets of enquiries, one normative and the other 
descriptive, can be made for the purpose of concretising the 
idea of good faith. The normative one essentially is: “Should the 
party (defendant) act in good faith?”; and the descriptive one 
essentially is: “Has the party (defendant) breached [a duty of] 
good faith?” However, both sets of enquiries on good faith shall 
be concretised into more specific enquiries on reasonable 
expectations of the contractual parties, honesty, and fair dealing 
or fairness in the dealing process.  
Although contracting parties do not owe each other 
sympathy, empathy, or charity, they are expected to refrain 
from sharp practices and opportunistic breach that negates the 
purpose and objective of the contract.  In other words, 
contracting parties enter into the arrangement with certain 
reasonable expectations regarding performance and 
administration of the contract. This kinship between good faith 
and reasonable expectations provides a means of revising the 
good faith doctrine by reference to reasonable expectations. 
Dishonest or unduly opportunistic behaviour in dealing is an 
unfair surprise that improperly deprives a party of the benefit 
of the bargain.   
 
 81 Roger Brownsword, “Good Faith in Contract Law Revisited” (1996) 49 CLP 
111, 151. 
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Applying this approach creates the following normative 
enquiries  for scrutinising contract performance: (1) Should the 
conduct at issue help to honour the reasonable expectations of 
the contractual parties? (2) Should the allegedly culpable party 
be honest in the conduct at issue? (3) Should the conduct at issue 
be a “fair dealing”? It is unimaginable and unlikely that contract 
law would allow negative answers to any of the three 
normative enquiries. This effectively means that the 
requirement of good faith can be concretised normatively into 
the principle of honouring reasonable expectations, the duty of 
honesty, and the  duty of fair dealing.  
Correspondingly, the descriptive enquiries in a dispute 
over good faith in contract are: (1) Does the conduct at issue 
help to honour the reasonable expectations of the contractual 
parties? If yes, there is probably no breach of good faith; if no, 
probably there is a breach. Both answers however are tentative 
presumptions, and further enquiries are needed. (2) Is the 
allegedly culpable party honest in the conduct at issue? If not, 
there is a breach of good faith—full stop. If yes, a further 
enquiry is necessary. (3) Is the conduct a “fair dealing”? If yes, 
there is no breach of good faith; if no, there is a breach.  
Only when one of the contractual parties in dispute has 
raised issues of good faith, is it necessary for judges and/or 
arbitrators to make all these enquiries, whether normative or 
descriptive. Both the normative enquiries and the descriptive 
enquiries are useful where there is neither statutory nor 
contractual term of good faith but it is raised as an issue by one 
of the parties. The descriptive enquiries are also useful where 
there is an express general term of good faith in contract or a 
statutory general requirement of good faith applicable thereto. 
In the context of Singapore contract law, the two sets of 
enquiries are proper. The normative and descriptive enquiries 
on reasonable expectations are aligned with the extra-judicial 
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proposition of Arden LJ, (as she was then), who stated in a 
public speech to the legal profession in Singapore, that she 
“would apply the principle of giving effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to the debate on good faith”. 82 It is 
also consistent with the Singaporean academic view that a 
model of good faith based on reasonable expectations exists and 
it should prevail over the morality-based model.83 In a real 
sense, the principle of honouring reasonable expectations, from 
and as the basis of good faith, organises the variety of 
embodiments of good faith.  
It is also proper for Singaporean courts to make the 
normative and the descriptive sets of enquiries on honesty and 
fair dealing, which is the core meaning of good faith as is 
recognised by the SGCA:  
At its core, the concept of good faith encompasses the 
threshold subjective requirement of acting honestly, as well as 
the objective requirement of observing accepted commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the performance of the identified 
obligations.84 
This core meaning of good faith is also consistent with 
that in Anglo-American contract law. On the meaning of good 
faith, Bingham LJ has observed that good faith “is in essence a 
 
 82 Lady Justice Arden, “Coming to Terms with Good Faith” (2013) 30 JCL 199, 
212 (emphasis added). This article is based on a Distinguished Speaker’s Lecture 
given to the Singapore Academy of Law on 26 April 2013 by invitation of Justice 
Menon, the Chief Justice of Singapore.  
 83 Woo Pey Yee, “Protecting Parties’ Reasonable Expectations: A General 
Principle of Good Faith” (2001) 1 OUCLJ 195, 223-24. 
 84 HSBC (n 19) [45]. 
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principle of fair and open dealing.”85 Extra-judicially, Lord 
Steyn has stated:  
Undoubtedly, good faith has a subjective requirement: the 
threshold requirement is that the party must act honestly. … 
But good faith additionally sets an objective standard, viz., the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing[.]86 
Lord Hobhouse described good faith as “a principle of 
fair dealing”.87 What good faith requires “includes the core 
value of honesty”,88 and could be described as “good faith and 
“fair dealing”.89 In American contract law, the “obligation of 
good faith in performance and enforcement”90 of contracts 
which are subject to the Uniform Commercial Code “means 
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.”91  
 
 85 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433 
(CA), 439 (per Bingham LJ). 
 86 J Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest 
Men” (1997) 113 LQR 433, 438. Also extra-judicially, see Lady Justice Arden (n 82) 
200. 
 87 Manifest Shipping Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] 
UKHL 1 [48] 
 88 Yam Seng (n 14) [141] (per Leggatt J); Monde Petrpoleum (n 53) [336]. See also 
Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch) [196(iv)] 
(“[G]ood faith extends beyond, but at the very least includes, the requirement of 
honesty.”)( DJ Richard Spearman QC). 
 89 Yam Seng (n 14) [150] (per Leggatt J). 
 90 Uniform Commercial Code § 1-304. 
 91 Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(20). 
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B.  An Organizing Principle of  Reasonable Expectations 
1.  An organizing principle: A better alternative 
One of the two major judicial innovations in the Bhasin v 
Hrynew approach to the requirement of good faith in contract 
law is that, rather than finding it through the conventional 
implication of terms into contract, the SCC recognised good 
faith an “organizing principle”. The SCC has pointed out that 
“an organizing principle states in general terms a requirement 
of justice from which more specific legal doctrines may be 
derived…[It] therefore is not a free-standing rule, but rather a 
standard that underpins and is manifested in more specific 
legal doctrines.”92  
An “organizing principle of good faith” is a standard 
rather than a rule and arguably it is “not a substantive 
principle”93  Yet, so long as courts may actually give it weight 
to develop the law, the ever-lasting concerns over uncertainty 
in the conception of good faith will loom persistently. 94  This is 
perhaps partly why the new general organizing principle of 
good faith has been prone to criticisms, such as that it “has the 
potential to generate an unforeseen host of discrete 
obligations”.95 Hence, an organizing principle better than that 
of good faith might be needed.  
The better alternative is an organizing principle of 
reasonable expectations. As noted above, this follows Arden 
 
 92 Bhasin (n 1) [64]. 
 93 Daniele Bertolini, “Decomposing Bhasin v Hrynew: Towards an Institutional 
Understanding of the General Organizing Principle of Good Faith in Contractual 
Performance” [2017] UTLJ 348, 351. 
 94 Bhasin (n 1) [64] 
 95 Chris DL Hunt, “Good Faith Performance in Canadian Contract Law” 
(2015) 74 CLJ 4, 7. 
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LJ’s comments in Singapore96 and also the local academic view 
in this regard. 97 For three reasons, an organizing principle of 
reasonable expectations is better than that of good faith. First, 
while the Bhasin approach was perhaps innovative, it addressed 
the issue of good faith by starting essentially from “an 
organizing principle of good faith” per se. At least to some 
extent, this was repeating the issue itself. Methodologically this 
is undesirable. Instead, we need to think beyond good faith and 
to understand it in terms of something else—such as reasonable 
expectations in the least—that is closely connected to good 
faith. Second, actually there is recognised close connection 
between keeping good faith and fulfilling reasonable 
expectations: as is to be discussed below, the former is a means 
and the latter is an end. It is more sensible to recourse to a well-
recognised end than to the controversial means. Third, 
recognised in contract law of both legal traditions, the principle 
of honouring reasonable expectations is less controversial and 
more acceptable to both parties of either legal tradition than the 
organizing principle of good faith. 
2.  Good Faith as Means to Reasonable Expectations as End 
In English law, the principle of (honouring) reasonable 
expectations is actually more closely connected with the 
requirement of good faith than is realised. To Lord Steyn, “there 
is another theme of good faith and fair dealing: the reasonable 
expectations of honest men must be protected.” 98 A less direct 
 
 96 Lady Justice Arden (n 82) 212. 
 97 Yee (n 83) 223-24. 
 98 J Steyn, “The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair-
Shirt Philosophy” [1991] Denning LJ 131, 131: “The first imperative of good faith and 
fair dealing is that contracts ought to be upheld.” 
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but still close relation between them is mediated through 
implied term. Lord Steyn stated: “The implication of terms 
fulfils an important function in promoting the reasonable 
expectations of parties.”99 Particularly noteworthy is Arden LJ’s 
extra-judicial statement in Singapore in relation to express 
terms of good faith in contract: 
I would apply the principle of giving effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to the debate on good faith clauses 
in the following way. If the parties have agreed that 
contractual obligations should be performed in good faith, the 
court should, so far as it can, give effect to that agreement and, 
by doing so, to the parties’ reasonable expectations. 100 
It can be seen from the foregoing judicial and extra-
judicial observations that the requirement of good faith is a 
means of ensuring that reasonable expectations can be 
honoured, which is the end. That is perhaps why to Lord Steyn 
“there is not a world of difference between the objective 
requirement of good faith and the reasonable expectations of 
the parties.”101As long as the end can be achieved, the arguably 
controversial means could be left in the shadow of the end. That 
is perhaps also why Lord Steyn considered that the respect for 
the reasonable expectations of the parties made it unnecessary 
to adopt any general concept of good faith in English contract 
law. 102 Similarly, in the view of American contract law:  
 
 99 J Steyn, “The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts” (2003) 
25 Sydney L Rev 5, 11. 
 100 Lady Justice Arden (n 82) 212.   
 101 Lord Steyn (n 86) 439. 
 102 Ibid. 
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Good faith is simply another embodiment of the basic 
principle of contract law—the protection of reasonable 
expectations. The application of that principle through the 
good faith obligation leads to the proper understanding of the 
content of the doctrine [of good faith] and a rejection of many 
of the ways that courts improperly cabin it.103 
It is noteworthy that in recent years English contract law 
already started to use the conception of reasonable or justified 
expectations to explain the content of (utmost) good faith, 
which is “to adhere to the spirit of the contract… and to observe 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, and to be 
faithful to the agreed common purpose, and to act consistently 
with the justified expectations of the parties.”104 This followed from 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that “Good faith 
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasises 
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with 
the justified expectations of the other party”.105 More recently in 
2017, explaining the content of a duty of good faith, Leggatt J 
(as he was before becoming Leggatt LJ later that year) 
reiterated:  
A duty to act in good faith, where it exists, is a modest 
requirement. It does no more than reflect the expectation that 
a contracting party will act honestly towards the other party 
and will not conduct itself in a way which is calculated to 
frustrate the purpose of the contract or which would be 
 
 103 Jay M Feinman, “Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations” (2014) 67 
Arkansas L Rev 525, 526. 
 104 CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company [2010] EWHC 
1535 (Ch) [246] (per Vos J, emphasis added).  
 105 Restatement (Second) Contracts s 205 cmt (a) (1981). Cited approvingly in 
Berkeley Community Villages v Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330 (Ch) [95], [97]. 
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regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and 
honest people.106  
In Canadian contract law, “it may be more realistic to 
suggest that the implied limitation on the exercise of the 
discretion is intended to give effect to the “reasonable 
expectations of the parties.”107 Anglo-Canadian law “does not 
need to legislate a standard of good faith because it has evolved 
sufficiently towards the protection of justified expectations”108 
and that “reference to justified [or reasonable] expectations … 
is much more satisfactory than good faith as a guide to the 
resolution of practical problems.” 109  
The requirement of good faith is not only a moral 
demand,110 but also—and more importantly—serves a 
utilitarian purpose of ensuring that contractual parties” 
reasonable expectations can be honoured in contract law. This 
is arguably so for the requirement of good faith in Section 205 
 
 106 Astor Management AG v Atalaya Mining Plc [2017] EWHC 425 (Comm) [98]. 
This is consistent with his description of good faith in Yam Seng Pte (n 14) [137], [138], 
[139]. Although the implication in Yam Seng of a duty of good faith in performance 
of contract has not really received judicial welcome in the UK—until more recently 
in Bates v Post Office Ltd [2019] EWHC 606 (QB)—in relation to relational contract, his 
opinion on the content or the meaning of good faith has not been cast into doubt, nor 
has it been in Bates.  
 107 JD McCamus, The Law of Contracts (2nd edn, Irwin Law 2012) 865.  
 108 Michael Bridge, “Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of 
Good Faith?” (1984) 9 Can Bus LJ 385, 425-26. 
 109 Ibid 400. 
 110 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, 603 per Lord Cockburn CJ: “The question 
[of non-disclosure] is not what a man of scrupulous morality or nice honour would 
do under such circumstances.” 
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of the Restatement and other sections which are consistent with 
it.111 
The means-and-end relationship between good faith and 
reasonable expectations also exist in European civilian contact 
law.  It is recognized in the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(“DCFR”), where it is stated that the principle of protection of 
reasonable reliance and expectations “could be arrived at by 
applying the general principles of good faith and fair 
dealing.”112 
3.  Honouring Reasonable Expectations: The Underpinnings of 
Contract Law 
Whilst for too long the role of expectations in contract 
(law) has been subsumed into that of intentions, expectations 
have a substantive role in the formation of contract,113 and the 
performance of contract obligations are founded upon 
reasonable expectations induced by a promise.114 This is the first 
 
 111 Bridge, Anglo-Canadian Contract Law (n 108) 389-95, arguing that those 
Restatement sections and the relevant case law decisions do not treat moral 
culpability as a central issue. 
 112 C von Bar, E Clive and H Schulte-Nölke et al, DCFR Outline Edition (Sellier 
2009) 77 [25]. 
 113 Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd [1992] Adjudication Law Reports 
07/20 [6] (Steyn LJ)(For “the issue of contract formation … four matters are of 
importance. The first is the fact that English law generally adopts an objective theory 
of contract formation. That means that in practice our law generally ignores the 
subjective expectations and the unexpressed mental reservations of the parties. 
Instead the governing criterion is the reasonable expectations of honest men, and in 
the present case that means that the yardstick is the reasonable expectations of 
sensible businessmen.”) This was applied in RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois 
Muller Gmbh & Company KG (UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14. 
 114 The observations can be borne out by the observations of Adam Smith, John 
Austin as well as other classical and modern Anglo-American contract law treatise 
writers such as Anson, Pollock, Corbin, Arthur Goodhart, and Hugh Collins. See 
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premise of the recognised importance of contractual parties’ 
reasonable expectations in contract law. The second premise is 
the validity of the qualifier “reasonable”.  One should not 
ignore “the legal implication in contracts of what is reasonable, 
which runs throughout the whole of modern English law in 
relation to business contracts.”115 In the common law tradition, 
the “reasonableness” qualifier is “an objective norm of 
behaviour”.116 In European civilian contract law, 
“reasonableness” is “to be objectively ascertained, having 
regard to the nature and purpose of what is being done, to the 
circumstances of the case and to any relevant usages and 
practice.”117 Therefore, although expectations might seem 
subjective, reasonable expectations are more objective than 
subjective.  
Hence it is not surprising that prominent judges have 
called for protection of reasonable expectations over at least the 
last two decades. Most notable among them was Lord Steyn, 
who for example opined in First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian 
International Bank Ltd: 118 
A theme that runs through our law of contract is that the 
reasonable expectations of honest men must be protected. It is 
 
Yong Q Han, Policyholder’s Reasonable Expectations (Hart Publishing 2016) Sub-
Chapter 3-I. 
 115 Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd [1932] All ER 494 (HL) 507 (per Lord Wright) 
 116 Richard Hooley, “Controlling Contractual Discretion” (2013) CLJ 65, 74. 
 117 DCFR Art. I-1:104. See also C. Von Bar & E. Clive (eds.), Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) (OUP 2010). 
 118 First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
194 (CA), 196. See also J Steyn, “The Role of Good Faith (n 98) 131; J Steyn (n 86) 433 
and 422; Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408 (HL) 460G-H; J 
Steyn, The Intractable Problem (n 99)11. 
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not a rule or principle of law. It is the objective which has been 
and still is the principal moulding force of our law of contract. 
In Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd,119 Lord Steyn 
again stated that “[t]he law of contract should give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of contracting parties”, and repeated 
this sentiment in Society of Lloyd’s v Robinson,120 where he noted 
that “[t]he implication of a term to control contractual discretion 
‘is essential to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the 
parties’”.121 Writing extra-judicially Lord Steyn also stated that 
“in the event of doubt, the working assumption [for 
interpretation of commercial contract] will be that a fair 
construction best matches the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.”122 
Lord Steyn was not alone in this regard. He has since 
been echoed with by the observation of Sir Robin Cooke that 
“giving effect to reasonable expectations … is a prime object of 
the law in almost all fields.”123 Dyson LJ also implied a term of 
good faith into a loan agreement to “give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties”.124 Recently, Lord 
Hoffmann asserted “[t]he purpose of the law of contract is to 
fulfil reasonable expectations and such expectations should 
 
 119 Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68 (CA) 76 (per Steyn 
LJ). 
 120 Society of Lloyd’s v Robinson [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 329 (HL) 333-34 (per Lord 
Steyn, emphasis added).  
 121 Equitable Life (n 118) 460G-H (emphasis added); see also 461H- 462A (per 
Lord Cooke). 
 122 J Steyn, Contract Law (n 86) 441. 
 123 R Cooke, “Book Review” (1992) 108 LQR 334, 336 (emphasis added). 
 124 Nash v Paragon Finance Plc [2001] EWCA 1466 [36]. 
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therefore be self-fulfilling.”125 Arden LJ has observed extra-
judicially in Singapore:  
[I]n the field of interpretation of contractual documents, the 
courts have come to recognise…that there is another 
important principle…which underlies contract law, namely 
the need for the court where possible to give effect to the 
parties’ reasonable expectations. This is properly regarded as 
a principle.126  
“Reasonable expectations resonate throughout the 
spectrum of contract doctrines, from formation to consideration 
and through to performance.”127 No less often, the reasonable 
expectations approach operates inconspicuously in the name of 
other concepts and doctrines in contract law. One example is 
that damages for breach of contract will only compensate losses 
that were reasonably contemplated or expected by the parties 
when they made the contract. The other example is estoppel—
where one party has induced the other party to have reasonably 
expected benefits or interests which will accrue under the 
contract in question and to act to its own detriment, the 
inducing party cannot renege to frustrate the other party’s 
reasonable expectations.  
In continental European civil law, reasonable 
expectations are more expressly relevant in the DCFR. In the 
notes to DCFR, it is stated that there are four underlying 
principles, namely freedom, security, justice and security. 
Regarding security, it is noted: 
 
 125 Lord Hoffmann, “The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability?” 
(2010) 14 Edin L Rev 47, 59. 
 126 Lady Justice Arden, “Coming to Terms with Good Faith” (2013) 30 JCL 199, 
211-12 (emphasis added). 
 127 Feinman (n103) 534-549. 
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19. Protection of reasonable reliance and expectations. This is 
an aspect of security which appears in different parts of the 
DCFR. It first appears in relation to contract formation. … The 
protection of reasonable reliance and expectations is a core aim of the 
DCFR, just as it was in PECL. Usually this protection is 
achieved by holding the mistaken party to the obligation 
which the other party reasonably assumed was being 
undertaken.128 
Although the examples in the full paragraph above are 
concerned more with protection of reliance than of expectations 
in contract law, a number of other DCFR provisions expressly 
prescribe that one party can reasonably expect that the other 
party has certain obligations. For more examples, the DCFR 
provides that the business party “has a duty to disclose to the 
other person such information…to be supplied as the other 
person can reasonably expect”. 129 Failing that, the business 
party “has such obligations under the contract as the other 
party has reasonably expected”.130 Where the quality of the 
subject matter of a contract cannot be determined, “the quality 
required is the quality which the recipient could reasonably 
expect in the circumstances.”131 Goods must inter alia “be 
supplied along with such accessories, installation instructions 
or other instructions as the buyer may reasonably expect to 
receive; and possess such qualities and performance 
capabilities as the buyer may reasonably expect.”132 Other 
examples of express provisions for contractual parties’ 
 
 128 DCFR Outline Edition (n112) 73-74 [19] (emphasis added). 
 129 DCFR Article II.–3:101(1). 
 130 DCFR Article II.–3:109(2). 
 131 DCFR Article II.–9:108(2). 
 132 DCFR Article IV. A.–2:302 (2) paras (e) and (f). 
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reasonable expectations concern coverage in consumer goods 
guarantee,133 conformity of goods under lease,134 pre-
contractual duties to warn of risks in the context of contract of 
services,135 conformity in the context of contract of storage,136 
conformity of goods for donation,137 and measure of damages 
in the context of contract of donation.138 The provisions for 
reasonable expectations are not limited to the law of contract, 
and they extend to the law of property/ownership, 139 of 
restitution, 140 and even of tort. 141 Apart from the DCFR, in the 
national positive laws of Germany, France and the Netherlands, 
interpretations of contract law rules and decisions are to the 
effect of honoring reasonable expectations are readily 
detectable. 142   
4.  Honesty 
The requirement of acting honestly could be legitimately 
thought to be universal for contract-based transactions in both 
common law and civil law. It is not surprising that Justice 
Cromwell held in Bhasin v Hrynew: 
 
 133 DCFR Article IV. A.–6:104(b). 
 134 DCFR Article IV. B.–3:103(e) & (f). 
 135 DCFR Article IV. C.–2:102(c). 
 136 DCFR Article IV. C.–5:105(2). 
 137 DCFR Article IV. H.–3:102(1) & (2). 
 138 DCFR Article IV. H.–3:205(3). 
 139 DCFR Article VIII.–1:101.  
 140 DCFR Outline Edition (n 112) 82 [35]. See also the DCFR Article VII.–2:101(4). 
 141 DCFR Article VI.–2:101(3) (emphasis added). 
 142 See R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (OUP 1996) 637-38; C Girot, User Protection in IT Contracts (Kluwer 2001) 38-
44. 
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[T]here is a general duty of honesty in contractual 
performance. This means simply that parties must not lie or 
otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters 
directly linked to the performance of the contract. This does 
not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party 
to forego advantages flowing from the contract; it is a simple 
requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one’s 
contractual performance. 143 
A duty of honesty “interferes very little with freedom of 
contract, since parties will rarely expect that their contracts 
permit dishonest performance of their obligations.” 144 It “poses 
no risk to commercial certainty. . . . A reasonable commercial 
person would expect, at least, that the other party to a contract 
would not be dishonest about his or her performance. The duty 
is also clear and easy to apply.” 145 Those who fear the assumed 
interference and uncertainty “may take comfort from 
experience of the civil law of Quebec and the common and 
statute law of many jurisdictions in the United States.” 146  
Just as the test of dishonesty of an accessory to a trust 
relationship, which also demands good faith, has been found by 
the Privy Council to be objective, the test of honesty should be 
objective too. Although honesty certainly does have a strong 
subjective element, the subjective characteristics of honesty do 
not mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of 
honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what 
constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an 
 
 143 Bhasin (n 1) [73]. 
 144 Ibid [76], [81]. 
 145 Ibid [80]. 
 146 Ibid [82]. 
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optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the 
moral standards of each individual.147  
5.  Fair Dealing  
Fair dealing has been well accepted in the common law 
of contract as the objective sense of good faith. So the natural 
and further enquiry of whether the conduct in question is a fair 
dealing is, in principle, unlikely to be problematic under 
English-Singaporean contract law—and similarly so under 
civilian contract law too.  
In Europe, the DCFR also recognises “good faith and fair 
dealing”, i.e. good faith in the sense of fair dealing, as an 
objective “a standard of conduct” which is “characterised by 
honesty, openness and consideration for the interests of the 
other party “.148 In Asian civil law jurisdictions, as for example, 
the Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law and the Chinese 
Contract Act, the principle of fairness149 is parallel to the 
principle of good faith150 as the fundamental principles of 
 
 147 Royal Brunel Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC), 389 (per Lord Nicholls). 
The objectivity of the test of (dis)honesty was defended by Lord Millett in Twinsectra 
Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12 (though the lead judgment delivered by Lord Hutton 
found a combined subjective-objective test), and was re-affirmed in Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37. 
 148 DCFR Art. I-1:103. The DCFR distinguishes “good faith” per se from “good 
faith and fair dealing”. In contrast to “good faith and fair dealing” being an objective 
“standard of conduct”, “good faith” is defined as “a mental attitude characterised by 
honesty and an absence of knowledge that an apparent situation is not the true 
situation.” Clearly “good faith” in the DCFR is similar to subjective good faith, i.e. 
honesty, in common law. “Good faith and fair dealing” in the DCFR is akin to 
objective good faith, i.e. fair dealing, in common law. 
 149 Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law 2016, section 6; Chinese Contract 
Act 1999, s 5; Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law 1986 (repealed), s 4. 
 150 Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law 2016, section 7; Chinese Contract 
Act 1999, s 6; Chinese General Provisions of Civil Law 1986 (repealed), s 4. 
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private law (including contract law). The Japanese Civil Code 
section 1(2) provides for the principle of good faith since 1896, 
and the additional section 1(3) for the principle against abuse of 
rights since 1947. The latter followed the European (mainly 
French) civil law tradition,151 in whose contemporary fashion 
“the general principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights … 
constitutes one of the applications of the general duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its limitative function.”152 The 
prohibition of abuse of rights “is founded on the restrictive 
function of reasonableness and fairness”153 and is consistent 
with “the reasonableness and fairness-based Civil Law 
tradition.”154 
What, then, is the meaning of fair dealing? Actually the 
more practically useful question is: how are courts to find 
whether the dealing in question is “fair”?  In English contract 
law, for the requirement of good faith, “fair dealing is defined 
by the contract and by those standards of conduct to which, 
objectively, the parties must reasonably have assumed 
compliance without the need to state them. The advantage of 
including reference to fair dealing is that it draws attention to 
the fact that the standard is objective.”155  
In substance, this approach to defining or finding “fair 
dealing” is consistent with the European civil law standards for 
fair dealing, namely “honesty, openness and consideration for 
 
 151 Kazuaki Sono and Yasuhiro Fujioka, “The Role of the Abuse of Right 
Doctrine in Japan” (1975) 35 La L Rev 1038, 1039-40. See also Albert Maryland, 
“Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec” (1974) 43 La L Rev 993, 994, 1006, 1011. 
 152 Annekatrien Lenaerts, “The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse 
of Rights: A Critical Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract Law” [2010] 
ERPL 1121, 1127, 1153. 
 153 Ibid 1127. 
 154 Ibid 1121, 1127, 1153. 
 155 Yam Seng (n 14) [150]. See also Lady Justice Arden (n 82) 200. 
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the interests of the other party to the transaction or relationship 
in question”156 as prescribed in the DCFR. Given that in both 
legal traditions fair dealing has been recognised as the objective 
sense of good faith, and also the standards for finding fair 
dealing are essentially homogeneous, it is natural that “in this 
sense [i.e. fair dealing as objective good faith], judges in the 
greater part of the industrialised world usually have no great 
difficulty in identifying a case of bad faith.”157  
The recourse to fair dealing is very likely to be 
challenged for being a recipe for uncertainty. To some extent, 
such challenges are legitimate. Meanwhile, for concerns over 
uncertainties in commercial (contract) law, what has been noted 
by the SGCA is particularly noteworthy: 
A certain measure of uncertainty will always be an integral 
part of the judicial process and, hence, of the law itself. … 
Given this reality, however, one of the key functions of the 
courts is not to add unnecessarily to the uncertainty that already 
exists.158 
Therefore, as long as the judicial approach to finding 
what is or is not fair dealing does not lead unnecessarily to more 
uncertainties, the uncertainty underlying conceptions as “fair” 
and “reasonable” is what the world of law has been able to cope 
with. These conceptions are prima facie riddled with 
uncertainty and abstractness when they are detached from 
specific factual matrix. In reality, however, they exist not in 
vacuum but in specific case scenarios. Once fairness is 
contextualised in a specific case, the contextual approach can 
 
 156 DCFR, Art. I-1:103.  
 157 J Steyn, Contract law (n 86) 438. 
 158 Jet Holding (n 45) [90]. 
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concretise what is fairness in that scenario. In this way, the 
contextual approach to finding fair dealing alleviates rather 
than adds to its abstract uncertainty.  
6.  The Myth of Presumed Intentions for Implied Terms 
Regarding implied terms as a source of good faith, they 
are critiqued in Bhasin v Hrynew:159 “The categories of terms 
implied…sometimes are blurred or even ignored, resulting in 
uncertainty and a lack of coherence at the level of principle.” 
Although this is not the occasion to discuss in depth the 
problems with the common law mode of implying terms into 
contract, for the purpose here it helps to note Lord Steyn’s extra-
judicial view that it is a “myth”160 to regard an implied term as 
based on the contractual parties’ inferred actual intentions (i.e. 
presumed intentions), although it has been the conventional 
wisdom to so regard since The Moorcock. 161 “The reasonable 
expectations of the parties in an objective sense are controlling 
[in implying a term into contract]: they sometimes demand that 
such terms be imputed to the parties.”162 Imputed intentions are 
those which, albeit do not exist or cannot be deduced, are 
attributed to the parties; whereas inferred or presumed 
intentions are those which are objectively deduced to be the 
subjective actual intention of the parties.163  Arguably, “it may 
 
 159 Bhasin (n 1) [52]. 
 160 J Steyn, The Intractable Problem (n 99) 11. 
 161 The Moorcock (n 42) 68 (per Bowen LJ). See also Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL 
Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 43 [91]. 
 162 J Steyn, The Intractable Problem (n 99) 11.  
 163 Jones v Knot [2011] UKSC 53 [26-27], Lady Hale and Lord Walker agreeing 
with and citing Lord Neuberger in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17. In Jones v Knott,  
the distinction was recognised also by Lord Collins, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson,  
though it was dismissed (only) by Lord Collins as unimportant in practice. Although 
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be realistic to assume that implied duties of good faith are 
likely, on occasion at least, to slide into the category of legal 
incidents rather than mere presumed intentions.”164  
V. CONCLUSION 
In view of the everlasting importance of international 
trade to Singapore’s status as a hub of international commerce, 
and Singapore’s rising status as “as a leading forum for legal 
services and commercial dispute resolution”, 165 it is in 
Singapore’s interest to try to reconcile the differences between 
English-Singaporean (and Commonwealth) contract law and 
European-Asian civilian contract law in respect of good faith in 
commercial contracts. For express terms of good faith, 
Singapore’s Asian perspective taken in HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd 166 
is useful where there is an Asian party to a contract in question. 
Other than that, common law’s conventional wisdom about 
good faith is inadequate for the reconciliatory purpose. Hence, 
Singaporean contract lawyers might as well think beyond the 
conventional wisdom and think big well ahead of the next 
potential judicial opportunity.  
For this purpose, the innovative approach in Bhasin v 
Hrynew is enlightening to some extent, particularly its 
“organizing principle” approach; but Bhasin v Hrynew cannot be 
taken fully as a model or example. Along this line, a framework 
partly illustrated by Bhasin v Hrynew can be set up for thinking 
 
these two cases are in the context of family property law, the nature of intentions in 
this context is hardly different from that in contract law or in private law broadly. 
 164 McCamus (n 107) 865. 
 165 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee [4(a)] 
(Singapore Ministry of Law 2013).  
 166 HSBC (n 19). 
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big over good faith in commercial contracts. This framework 
consists of an organising principle of honouring reasonable 
expectations, a duty of honesty, and a duty of fair dealing. The 
framework realistically concretises good faith into the three 
components, all of which are essentially objective and 
ascertainable in specific factual matrix and are well-recognised 
in both common law and civil law. Hence this framework is 
likely to be far less controversial than the conventional wisdom 
on good faith, and also less so than the organising principle of 
good faith in Bhasin v Hrynew. Admittedly, for the enterprise of 
thinking big over good faith, a framework is not all that is 
needed, and more building blocks for the framework must be 
expected. Nevertheless, this arguably less controversial 
framework is a meaningful start for contract lawyers’ joint 
enterprise of thinking big, in Singapore and even beyond, over 
good faith in international commercial contracts. 
